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Abstract
We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation
functions v1(·) and v2(·) over subsets ofm items, and their goal is to partition the items into S, S¯
in a way that maximizes the welfare, v1(S)+v2(S¯). We study both the allocation problem, which
asks for a welfare-maximizing partition and the decision problem, which asks whether or not
there exists a partition guaranteeing certain welfare, for binary XOS valuations. For interactive
protocols with poly(m) communication, a tight 3/4-approximation is known for both [Fei06,
DS06].
For interactive protocols, the allocation problem is provably harder than the decision prob-
lem: any solution to the allocation problem implies a solution to the decision problem with
one additional round and logm additional bits of communication via a trivial reduction. Sur-
prisingly, the allocation problem is provably easier for simultaneous protocols. Specifically, we
show:
• There exists a simultaneous, randomized protocol with polynomial communication that
selects a partition whose expected welfare is at least 3/4 of the optimum. This matches the
guarantee of the best interactive, randomized protocol with polynomial communication.
• For all ε > 0, any simultaneous, randomized protocol that decides whether the welfare
of the optimal partition is ≥ 1 or ≤ 3/4 − 1/108 + ε correctly with probability > 1/2 +
1/poly(m) requires exponential communication. This provides a separation between the
attainable approximation guarantees via interactive (3/4) versus simultaneous (≤ 3/4 −
1/108) protocols with polynomial communication.
In other words, this trivial reduction from decision to allocation problems provably requires the
extra round of communication. We further discuss the implications of our results for the design
of truthful combinatorial auctions in general, and extensions to general XOS valuations. In
particular, our protocol for the allocation problem implies a new style of truthful mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Intuitively, search problems (find the optimal solution) are considered “strictly harder” than de-
cision problems (does a solution with quality ≥ Q exist?) for the following (formal) reason: once
you find the optimal solution, you can simply evaluate it and check whether its quality is ≥ Q
or not. The same intuition carries over to approximation as well: once you find a solution whose
quality is within a factor α of optimal, you can distinguish between cases where solutions with
quality ≥ Q exist and those where all solutions have quality ≤ αQ. The easy conclusion one then
draws is that the communication (resp. runtime) required for an α-approximation to any decision
problem is upper bounded by the communication (resp. runtime) required for an α-approximation
to the corresponding search problem plus the communication (resp. runtime) required to evaluate
the quality of a proposed solution.
Note though that for communication problems, in addition to the negligible increase in com-
munication (due to evaluating the quality of the proposed solution), this simple reduction might
also require (at least) an extra round of communication (because the parties can evaluate a solu-
tion’s quality only after it is found). Still, it seems hard to imagine that this extra round is really
necessary, and that somehow protocols exist that guarantee an (approximately) optimal solution
without (approximately) learning their quality. The surprising high-level takeaway from our main
results is that this extra round of communication is provably necessary : Theorems 1.1 and 1.2
provide a natural communication problem (combinatorial auctions) such that a 3/4-approximation
for the search problem can be found by a simultaneous protocol1 with polynomial communication,
but every simultaneous prootcol guaranteeing a (3/4 − 1/108 + ε)-approximation for the decision
problem requires exp(m) communication.
At this point, we believe our results to have standalone interest, regardless of how we wound up
at this specific communication problem. But there is a rich history related to the design of truthful
combinatorial auctions motivating our specific question, which we overview below.
1.1 Combinatorial Auctions - how did we get here?
In a combinatorial auction, a designer with m items wishes to allocate them to n bidders so as to
maximize the social welfare. That is, if bidder i has a monotone valuation function vi : 2
[m] →
R+,
2 the designer wishes to find disjoint sets S1, . . . , Sn maximizing
∑
i vi(Si). The history of
combinatorial auctions is rich, and the problem has been considered with and without incentives,
with and without Bayesian priors, and in various models of computation (see Appendix A for brief
overview). The overarching theme in all of these works is to try and answer the following core
question: Are truthful mechanisms as powerful as (not necessarily truthful) algorithms?
For many instantiations of the above question, the answer is surprisingly yes. For example, with-
out concern for computational/communication complexity, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
auction is a truthful mechanism that always selects the welfare-maximizing allocation (and there-
fore achieves welfare equal to that of the best algorithm) [Vic61, Cla71, Gro73]. Of course, the
welfare maximization problem is NP-hard and also requires exponential communication between
the bidders, even to guarantee a 1/
√
m-approximation. A poly-time algorithm (with polynomial
communication) is known to match this guarantee [Rag88, KS98, BKV05], and interestingly, a poly-
time truthful mechanism (with polynomial communication) was later discovered as well [LS05].
1A simultaneous protocol has one round of communication: Alice and Bob each simultaneously send a message
and then no further communication takes place.
2By monotone, we mean that vi(S) ≥ vi(T ) for all T ⊆ S.
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The state of affairs gets even more interesting if we restrict to proper subclasses of monotone val-
uations such as submodular valuations.3 Here, a very simple greedy algorithm is known to find a 1/2-
approximation in both poly(n,m) black-box value queries to each vi(·), and polynomial runtime (in
n,m, and the description complexity of each vi(·)) [LLN01], and a series of improvements provides
now a (1-1/e)-approximation, which is tight [Von08, MSV08, DV12a]. Yet, another series of works
also proves that any truthful mechanism that runs in polynomial time (in n,m, and the description
complexity of each vi(·)), or makes only poly(n,m) black-box value queries to each vi(·) achieves
at best an 1/mΩ(1)-approximation [PSS08, BDF+10, BSS10, DSS15, Dob11, DV11, DV12b]. So
while poly-time algorithms, or algorithms making poly(n,m) black-box value queries can achieve
constant-factor approximations, poly-time truthful mechanisms and truthful mechanisms making
poly(n,m) black-box value queries can only guarantee an 1/mΩ(1)-approximation, and there is a
separation.
But this is far from the whole story: already ten years ago, quite natural truthful mechanisms
were developed that achieved an 1/O(log2m)-approximation [DNS06], which were subsequently
improved to 1/O(
√
logm) [Dob07, KV12, Dob16a], and even hold for the much broader class of
XOS valuations.4 As these approximation guarantees are better than the lower bounds referenced
in the previous paragraph, it seems that perhaps there should be some kind of contradiction: any
reasonable definition of “natural” should imply “poly-time,” right? The catch is that each of these
mechanisms are essentially posted-price mechanisms: they (essentially) offer each bidder a price pj
for item j, and let the buyer choose any subset of items they want to purchase. These prices can be
computed in poly-time, but the barrier is that deciding which subset of items the bidder wishes to
purchase, called a demand query, is in general NP-hard (assuming a succinct representation of the
valuation function is given), or requires exponentially many black-box value queries. So the only
reason these mechanisms don’t fall victim to the strong lower bounds of the previous paragraph is
because they get to ask each bidder to compute a single demand query, and this query is used to
select exactly the set of items that bidder receives.
The point is that while these existing separations are major results, and rule out certain classes
of natural truthful mechanisms from achieving desirable approximation ratios, they are perhaps
not addressing “the right” model if posted-price mechanisms with poly-time computable prices
provide approximation guarantees that significantly outperform known lower bounds. Therefore,
it seems that communication is really the right complexity measure to consider, if one wants the
resulting lower bounds to hold against all “natural” mechanisms. Unfortunately, the state-of-affairs
for communication complexity of combinatorial auctions lags pretty far behind the aforementioned
complexity measures. For instance, existing literature doesn’t provide a single lower bound against
truthful mechanisms that doesn’t also hold against algorithms. That is, wherever it’s known that
no truthful mechanism with communication at most C obtains an approximation ratio better than
α when buyers have valuations in class V , it’s because it’s also known that no algorithm/protocol
with communication at most C obtains an approximation ratio better than α when buyers have
valuations in class V . On the other hand, the best known truthful mechanisms with polynomial
communication for (say) XOS bidders achieve an 1/O(
√
logm) approximation [Dob16a], while the
best known algorithms with polynomial communication obtain a (1− 1/e)-approximation [DS06,
Fei06, FV06]. Even for the case of just two bidders, the best known truthful mechanisms with
3A function is submodular if v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
4A valuation is XOS if there exists a matrix of item valuations vij and vi(S) = maxj{
∑
i∈S vij}. XOS valuations are
also called fractionally subadditive, and are a proper subclass of subadditive valuations (where v(S∪T ) ≤ v(S)+v(T )).
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polynomial communication achieve a 1/2-approximation (which is trivial - just give the grand
bundle of all items to whoever values it most), while the best known algorithms with polynomial
communication achieve a 3/4-approximation (which is tight). It’s fair to say that determining
whether or not there’s a separation in what approximation guarantees are possible for algorithms
with polynomial communication and truthful mechanisms with polynomial communication for any
class of valuations between submodular and subadditive is one of the core, concrete open problems
in Algorithmic Mechanism Design.
Progress on this front had largely been stalled until very recent work of Dobzinski provided a
clear path to possibly proving a separation (and it seems to be an accepted conjecture that indeed
a separation exists) [Dob16b]. Without getting into details of the complete result, one implication
is the following: if there exists a truthful mechanism with polynomial communication for 2-player
combinatorial auctions with XOS (/submodular/subadditive) valuations that guarantees an ap-
proximation ratio of α, then there exists a simultaneous protocol with polynomial communication
for 2-player combinatorial auctions with XOS (/submodular/subadditive) valuations that guaran-
tees an approximation ratio of α as well. Let us emphasize this point again: in general, interactive
protocols with polynomial communication do not imply simultaneous protocols with polynomial
communication, and numerous well-known problems have polynomial interactive protocols, but re-
quire exponential simultaneous communication [PS82, DGS84, NW93, DNO14, ANRW15, Ass17].
But, Dobzinski’s result asserts that because of the extra conditions on truthful (interactive) mech-
anisms, their existence indeed implies a simultaneous (not necessarily truthful) protocol of com-
parable communication complexity. So “all” one has to do to prove lower bounds against truthful
mechanisms for 2-player combinatorial auctions is prove lower bounds against simultaneous proto-
cols, motivating the study of simultaneous 2-player combinatorial auctions.
At first glance, it perhaps seems obvious that achieving strictly better than a 1/2-approximation
via a simultaneous protocol should be impossible, and it’s just a matter of finding the right tools to
prove it.5 This is because quite strong lower bounds are known for “sketching” valuation functions,
that is, finding a succinct representation of a function that allows for approximate evaluation of
value queries. For example, it’s known that any sketching scheme for XOS valuations that allows for
evaluation of value queries to be accurate within a o(m)-factor requires superpoly(m) size [BDF+12].
So if somehow a 1/(2 − ε)-approximation could be guaranteed with a poly(m)-communication
simultaneous protocol, it is not because enough information is transmitted to evaluate value queries
within any non-trivial error. At first glance, it perhaps seems unlikely that such a protocol can
possibly exist. Surprisingly, our work shows not only that a 1/(2 − ε)-approximation is achievable
with poly(m) simultaneous communication, but (depending on exactly the question asked) poly(m)
simultaneous communication suffices to achieve the same approximation guarantees as the best
possible interactive protocol with poly(m) communication.
1.2 Simultaneous Protocols for Welfare Maximization
In this work, we specifically study the welfare maximization problem for two bidders with binary
XOS valuations.6 Binary XOS valuations are a natural starting point since welfare maximization
is especially natural when phrased as a communication problem. Depending on whether one wants
to decide the quality of the welfare-optimal allocation, or actually find an allocation inducing the
5Indeed, that is what the authors conjectured at the onset of this work.
6A function is binary XOS if all vij in the matrix representation are 0 or 1.
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optimal welfare, welfare maximization for binary XOS bidders is equivalent to one of the following:7
Definition 1.1 (BXOS Decision Problem). Alice is given as input a subsets of [m], A1, . . . , Aa.
Bob is given as input b subsets of [m], B1, . . . , Bb, and both see input X. Determine whether or not
there exists an i, j such that |Ai ∪ Bj | ≥ X. A protocol is an α-approximation if whenever there
exists an i, j such that |Ai ∪ Bj | ≥ X, it answers yes, and whenever maxi,j{|Ai ∪ Bj |} < X/α it
answers no, but may have arbitrary behavior in between.
Definition 1.2 (BXOS Allocation Problem). Alice is given as input a subsets of [m], A1, . . . , Aa.
Bob is given as input b subsets of [m], B1, . . . , Bb. Output a partition of items S, S¯ maximizing
maxi,j{|Ai ∩ S|+ |Bj ∩ S¯|} (over all partitions).8
Recall that typically we think of decision problems as being “easier” than allocation/search
problems: certainly if you can find a welfare maximizing allocation, you can also determine its
welfare (and this claim is formal for interactive protocols with poly(m) communication). Our main
result asserts that this intuition breaks down for simultaneous protocols: the decision problem is
strictly harder than the allocation/search problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
instance of such a separation.
Theorem 1.1. There exists a randomized, simultaneous protocol with poly(m) communication that
obtains a 3/4-approximation for the BXOS allocation problem. This is the best possible, as even
randomized, interactive protocols require 2Ω(m) communication to do better.
Theorem 1.2. For all ε > 0, any randomized, simultaneous protocol that obtains a (3/4−1/108+ε)-
approximation for the BXOS decision problem with probability larger than 1/2+1/poly(m) requires
2Ω(m) communication.
Future sections contain more precise versions (that reference the protocols achieving them) of
Theorems 1.1 (Theorem 4.1) and 1.2 (Theorem 5.1).
1.3 Extensions and Implications for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
Part of the analysis of our protocols actually makes use of the binary assumption (as opposed
to holding for general XOS). Part of the analysis, however, does not. In particular, our same
protocols when applied to general XOS functions yield a deterministic, simultaneous (3/4−1/32−ε)-
approximation for both problems, and a deterministic 2-round (3/4 − ε)-approximation for both
problems for general XOS functions.
We are also able to show that a modification of our protocol yields a 1/2-approximation for any
number of binary XOS bidders, and that this protocol implies a strictly truthful mechanism.9 The
mechanism is quite different from existing approaches, and could inspire better truthful mechanisms
in domains where previous molds (such as VCG-based/maximal-in-range) provably fail [PSS08,
BDF+10, BSS10, DSS15]. Essentially, the designer offers a menu of lotteries to each bidder and
the cost of each lottery depends on how “flexible” the option is. So for instance, taking item one
7Equivalent definitions are given in Section 1.4 which are stated more in the language of welfare maximization.
We pose these statements here since these formulations make for an especially natural communication problem.
8A protocol is an α-approximation if it outputs a partition S, S¯ guaranteeing α · maxi,j{|Ai ∩ S| + |Bj ∩ S¯|} ≥
maxi,j,T {|Ai ∩ T |+ |Bj ∩ T |}.
9By this we mean it is a strongly dominant strategy for bidders to follow the protocol, and not just that they are
indifferent between following and not following.
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deterministically will be more expensive than taking a single item uniformly at random. The pricing
scheme is designed exactly so that each bidder is strictly incentivized to follow our simultaneous
protocol.
Finally, while our results have standalone merit outside the scope of truthful combinatorial
auctions, it is important to properly quantify their impact in this direction. Dobzinski’s recent
reduction shows that truthful combinatorial auctions with polynomial communication imply simul-
taneous algorithms for the allocation problem. So Theorem 1.2 does not rule out the possibility of a
truthful mechanism for two XOS bidders that requires polynomial communication and guarantees
a 3/4-approximation (more on this in Section 6).
1.4 Brief Preliminaries and Roadmap
Below we give some brief preliminaries. Section 2 provides a toy setting to help develop intuition for
where the gap between allocation and decision problem comes from. Section 3 provides a warmup
for our protocols via a 2/3-approximation for the allocation problem and a 3/5-approximation for
the decision problem. Sections 4 and 4.1 contain our positive results, and Section 5 contains details
on our lower bound.
We’ll use the terms “protocol” and “mechanism” to distinguish between cooperative players and
strategic players. It will be clear from context exactly our model of communication, what we mean
by approximation, truthfulness, etc., and a more formal treatment of this appears in Appendix B.
We’ll also use the notation SW∗(v1, ..., vn) = maxS1∩···∩Sn=∅
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) to denote the maximum
social welfare attainable for the valuation profile (v1, . . . , vn).
Below are definitions of the valuation classes used in the paper. These are equivalent to the
definitions used in Section 1, but more apt for proofs and less apt for posing easy-to-parse commu-
nication problems.
Definition 1.3. We consider the following classes of valuations:
• A valuation function v is additive if for every bundle S, v(S) =∑i∈S v({i}).
• A valuation function v is XOS if there exist additive valuations a1, ..., at such that for every
bundle S, v(S) = maxti=1 ai(S). Each ai is called a clause of v.
• A valuation function v is binary additive if v is additive and for every item i, v({i}) ∈ {0, 1}.
We will sometimes refer to a binary additive valuation as a set, referring to {i|v({i}) = 1}.
• A valuation function v is binary XOS if v is XOS and all v’s clauses are binary additive
valuations. Again, we will sometimes refer to v’s clauses as sets to make it more natural to
talk about unions/intersections/etc.
2 Intuition for the Gap: an Extremely Toy Setting
Consider the following very toy setting: Alice and Bob each have some valuation function v(·) such
that v([m]) ∈ [1,M ], and v(·) is monotone (no other assumptions).10
Observation 1. In the very toy setting, Alice and Bob can guarantee the following tight approxi-
mation guarantees with zero communication:
10If one wishes, one could further restrict attention to submodular, XOS, etc., but this section is just supposed to
be a toy model to provide some intuition, and we will not belabor this point.
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• A 1/2-approximation for the allocation problem with a randomized protocol: give all the items
either to Alice or Bob uniformly at random.
• A 1/(M + 1)-approximation for the allocation problem with a deterministic protocol: give all
the items to Alice.
• A 1/(2M)-approximation for the decision problem (decide if social welfare ≥ X or ≤ X/(2M),
arbitrary behavior allowed in-between): If X > 2M output “≤ X/(2M)” If X ≤ 2M , “≥ X.”
Since this example is just to provide intuition, we omit a complete proof. The first bullet
should be fairly clear: the optimal welfare is clearly upper bounded by v1([m]) + v2([m]), and the
protocol guarantees exactly half of this. The third bullet should also be clear: the optimal welfare
is always between 1 and 2M . Moreover, any value in the range is possible (2M if, for instance,
v1({1}) = M = v2({2}). 1 if, for instance, v1(S) = v2(S) = 1 iff S ∋ 1, and v1(S) = v2(S) = 0
otherwise). So with zero communication, better than 1/(2M) is not possible. The middle bullet is
perhaps the only tricky one. If we give all of the items to Alice, we guarantee welfare v1([m]) ≥ 1,
and the optimum is upper bounded by v1([m]) +M .
Again, the purpose of this example is just to provide intuition as to where this gap might come
from, and we do not consider it a “result.” Of course, one should not expect the gaps to stay
quite so drastic as we dial up the communication: with just logM bits in the above example, a
deterministic protocol for the allocation problem and decision problem can both guarantee a 1/2-
approximation (output v([m])). But this example still captures some of the intuition as to where
the gap comes from.
3 Warmup: Beating a 1/2-Approximation
Before explaining our protocol, consider the following thought experiment: say instead Alice and
Bob are asked to just report a single clause from their valuation. What clause should they choose
and how well will this protocol solve the allocation/decision problem? It’s not too hard to see that
the best they can do is to just report the largest clause in their list (maximizes bi([m]) over all
clauses bj), which will obtain just a 1/2-approximation for each problem. Now, what if they each
report two clauses from their valuations, can they do something more clever? Well, they should
certainly try to report clauses that are large, as this lets the other know which sets they value the
most. But they should also try to report clauses that are different, as this allows for more flexibility
in an allocation that both parties value highly. It’s perhaps not obvious what the right tradeoff is
between large/different (or even exactly what “different” should formally mean), but it turns out
that a good approach is for Alice and Bob to each output the two clauses in their list with the
largest union (i.e. output bi, bj maximizing SW∗(bi, bj)). Subject to figuring out how to translate
this information into solutions, a slight variant of this protocol guarantees a 2/3-approximation for
the allocation problem, and a 3/5-approximation for the decision problem, and the proof is actually
quite simple. Note below that Theorem 3.1 holds only for BXOS, whereas Theorem 3.2 holds for
general XOS. We’ll provide both proofs below first, followed by a brief discussion.
Theorem 3.1. Protocol 1 gives a 2/3-approximation to the 2-party BXOS allocation problem.
Proof. First, we want to claim that if Alice sents bj to the auctioneer, then the resulting welfare is
at least SW∗(bj , v2). This is actually an instantiation of a claim we will want to reference later, so
we’ll state a more general form below:
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Protocol 1 Simultaneous randomized warmup protocol for 2-party combinatorial auctions with
binary XOS valuations
1: Alice finds b1, b2, b3 among clauses of her valuation v1 such that b1 maximizes b1([m]) and b2, b3
maximize SW∗(b2, b3). Then she picks j uniformly at random from {1, 2, 3} and sends bj to
the auctioneer.
2: For each item i, the auctioneer allocates it to Alice if bj({i}) = 1; otherwise allocate it to Bob.
Claim 1. Let b1 be a binary additive valuation and v2 be a binary XOS valuation. Then the
allocation that awards to Alice all items such that b1({i}) = 1 achieves welfare equal to SW∗(b1, v2).
Proof. Let A denote the set of items for which b1({i}) = 1, and consider any other allocation
(B, B¯). We first reason that we can remove from B all items /∈ A without hurting bj(B) + v2(B¯).
This is trivial to see, as bj has value 0 for all items /∈ A. Next, we reason that we can add to B any
item ∈ A without hurting bj(B)+v2(B¯). To see this, observe that we are certainly increasing bj(B)
by 1 when we make this change, as bj is just additive and bj({i}) = 1 for all i ∈ A. In addition, we
can’t possibly decrease v2(B¯) by more than 1, as all of the clauses in v2 are binary additive (and
therefore have value at most 1 for any item). So again, the total change is only positive. At the
end of these changes, observe that we have now transitioned from (B, B¯) to (A, A¯) without losing
any welfare, and therefore (A, A¯) is indeed optimal.
Claim 1 immediately lets us conclude that the expected welfare guaranteed by Protocol 1 is at
least 13 ·
∑3
j=1 SW∗(bj , v2). Now, let S and T be the optimal allocation to achieve SW∗(v1, v2). Let
a be the clause of v1 such that a(S) = v1(S). Let a
′ be the clause of v2 such that a
′(T ) = v2(T ). So
SW∗(v1, v2) = a(S) + a′(T ). From the protocol, we know that b1([m]) ≥ a([m]) ≥ a(S). Moreover,
if U and U ′ are the allocation that achieves SW∗(b2, b3), then we know that b2(U) + b3(U ′) =
SW∗(b2, b3) ≥ SW∗(a, b1) ≥ a(S) + b1(T ) (by definition of b2, b3). In expectation, the social
welfare we get in the protocol is at least:
1
3
·
3∑
j=1
SW∗(bj , v2) ≥ 1
3
· (b1(S) + a′(T ) + b2(U) + a′(U ′) + b3(U ′) + a′(U))
≥ 1
3
· (b1(S) + a′(T ) + a(S) + b1(T ) + a′([m])) ≥ 1
3
· (b1([m]) + a(S) + 2a′(T ))
≥ 1
3
· (2a(S) + 2a′(T )) = 2
3
· SW∗(v1, v2).
Theorem 3.2. Protocol 2 gives a 3/5-approximation to the 2-party XOS allocation problem and
the 2-party XOS decision problem.11
Proof. Let S and T be the optimal allocation to achieve SW∗(v1, v2). Let a be the clause of v1 such
that a(S) = v1(S). Let a
′ be the clause of v2 such that a
′(T ) = v2(T ). So SW∗(v1, v2) = a(S) +
a′(T ). From the protocol, we know that b1([m]) ≥ a([m]) ≥ a(S) and b4([m]) ≥ a′([m]) ≥ a′(T ). Let
11XOS allocation problem and XOS decision problem are the obvious extensions of BXOS allocation problem and
BXOS decision problem for non-binary clauses.
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Protocol 2 Simultaneous deterministic warmup protocol for 2-party combinatorial auctions with
XOS valuations
1: Alice finds b1, b2, b3 among clauses of her valuation v1 such that b1 maximizes b1([m]) and
b2, b3 maximize SW∗(b2, b3). Bob finds b4, b5, b6 among clauses of his valuation v2 such that b4
maximizes b4([m]) and b5, b6 maximize SW∗(b5, b6). Alice sends b1, b2, b3 to the auctioneer and
Bob sends b4, b5, b6 to the auctioneer simultaneously.
2: For allocation problem: Auctioneer finds j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j′ ∈ {4, 5, 6} that maximizes
SW∗(bj , b′j′) and allocate items according to it.
3: For decision problem: Let X be the parameter in the decision problem. Auctioneer finds
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j′ ∈ {4, 5, 6} that maximizes SW∗(bj, b′j′). If SW∗(bj , b′j′) ≥ 3X/5, say ”yes”
(SW∗(v1, v2) ≥ X). If SW∗(bj , b′j′) < 3X/5, say ”no”.
U and U ′ be the allocation to achieve SW∗(b2, b3). We know that b2(U)+b3(U ′) ≥ a(S)+b1(T ). Let
W andW ′ be the allocation to achieve SW∗(b5, b6). We know that b5(W )+b6(W ′) ≥ a′(T )+b4(S).
Then we have
SW∗(b1, b5) + SW∗(b1, b6) ≥ b1(W ′) + b5(W ) + b1(W ) + b6(W ′)
≥ b1([m]) + b5(W ) + b6(W ′) ≥ a(S) + a′(T ) + b4(S).
Similarly we have
SW∗(b2, b4) + SW∗(b3, b4) ≥ a(S) + a′(T ) + b1(T ).
The social welfare we get in the protocol is at least
SW∗(bj , b′j′)
≥ 1
5
· (SW∗(b1, b4) + SW∗(b1, b5) + SW∗(b1, b6) + SW∗(b2, b4) + SW∗(b3, b4))
≥ 1
5
· (b1(S) + b4(T ) + 2a(S) + 2a′(T ) + b4(S) + b1(T ))
≥ 1
5
· (b1([m]) + b4([m]) + 2a(S) + 2a′(T )) ≥ 3
5
(
a(S) + a′(T )
)
=
3
5
SW∗(v1, v2).
From this, it is easy to check that Protocol 2 gives a 3/5-approximation to both the 2-party XOS
allocation problem and the 2-party XOS decision problem.
So now there are two remaining questions: first, how does one generalize the reasoning in
Protocols 1 and 2 to multiple clauses? And second, why the heck is there a difference between
their guarantees for the allocation and decision problem for binary XOS valuations? For the first
question, we’ll postpone the details to Section 4, but just note here that our full protocols indeed
makes use of similar reasoning. For the second, observe that Claim 1 is somewhat magical: if
Alice’s valuation is binary additive, and Bob’s is binary XOS, then it is possible to allocate the
items optimally without any input from Bob (other than the knowledge that his valuation is indeed
binary XOS). While it’s not obvious that Claim 1 should necessarily be quite so helpful (given
that we do, in fact, get input from Bob), this turns out to be the crucial difference between the
allocation and decision problem. At a high level, there is necessarily some information lost between
Alice’s valuation and her message (ditto for Bob). The decision problem requires us to deal with
both losses, but Claim 1 lets certain kinds of protocols only worry about the loss from Alice.
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4 Developing Good Sketches
In this section, we define “sketches” in some specific forms for binary XOS valuations.12 They are
the main ingredients in our protocols and mechanisms. At a high level, the sketches are trying to
simultaneously maximize the size of the reported clauses, while also keeping on eye on reporting
“different” clauses. One can interpret the negative term as a “regularizer” that achieves this goal.
Definition 4.1 (Sketches of binary XOS valuations). For a binary XOS valuation v, define its
(k, α)-sketch (b1, ..., bk) as argmaxb1,...,bk∈{a1,...,at}
∑m
i=1
(
xi − α · x2i
)
, where a1, ..., at are the clauses
of v and xi =
b1({i})+···+bk({i})
k .
Remark 4.1. For the sketches defined above, there might be multiple (b1, ..., bk)’s maximize the
term. When we use a (k, α)-sketch in some protocol, we will use an arbitrary one. Additionally,
note that our warmup protocols from Section 3 ask Alice and Bob to output both their (1, 1/2)-sketch
and their (2, 1/2)-sketch.
In Appendix D, we prove some simple properties of these sketches, and an extension of the
definition to non-binary XOS valuations. Essentially, what the lemmas are stating is that for any
set A, the sketches defined above do a “good enough” job capturing Alice’s (/Bob’s) value for
A. Note that “good enough” doesn’t mean “captures v(A) within a constant factor,” as this is
impossible with a concise sketch [BDF+12]. “Good enough” simply means that the sketch can be
used inside a similar approach to Section 3.
Once sketches from Alice and Bob are in hand, there are a couple natural ways to “wrap up”
the allocation/decision problem. We’ll formally name these and refer to them in future protocols:
• Alice-Only Allocation (randomized): Pick a clause uniformly at random from Alice’s
sketch, award to Alice items for which that clause values at 1, and the rest to Bob.
• Best Known Allocation (deterministic): If Alice reports clauses a1, . . . , ak, and Bob
reports clauses b1, . . . , bk, find i, j maximizing SW∗(ai, bj). Allocate items according to the
allocation that yields SW∗(ai, bj).
• Best Known Decision(α,X) (deterministic): If Alice reports clauses a1, . . . , ak, and Bob
reports clauses b1, . . . , bk, find i, j maximizing SW∗(ai, bj). If SW∗(ai, bj) ≥ αX say “yes”
(guess that SW∗(v1, v2) ≥ X). Otherwise, guess “no” (guess that SW∗(v1, v2) < αX).
4.1 Our Protocols and Mechanisms
In this section, we’ll describe all protocols used to provide our positive results. All protocols involve
Alice and Bob reporting a (k, α)-sketch, and then using the Alice-Only or Best Known Allocation,
or making the Best Known Decision. All proofs are in Appendix E thru G. We make two remarks
before proceeding:
1. All of the high-level intuition for why the protocols work is captured by the sketches. Many
of the actual proofs are different, but at a high level everything comes down to the fact that
this class of sketches selects “the right” clauses to report for welfare maximization.
12Please forgive our slight abuse of the term “sketch.” We are using the term in the streaming sense, where “sketch”
just refers to a concise but lossy representation of a larger input, and not specifically to proper sketches of valuation
functions that preserve value queries within a constant factor.
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2. Any protocol that eventually uses the Alice-Only Allocation doesn’t require Alice to report
her entire sketch (she can just draw the random clause herself as in Protocol 1 (and have
communication m for any choice of k). While we state the guarantees for such protocols for
a fixed k, one can actually take k →∞ without increasing the communication at all.
Theorem 4.1. The following protocols achieve the following guarantees:
Alice’s sketch Bob’s Sketch Wrap-up Approximation Problem Valuations
(k, 1/2) ⊥ Alice-Only 3/4 − 1/k Allocation BXOS
(k, 1/3) (k, 1/3) Best Known Allocation 23/32 − 1/k Allocation XOS
(k, 1/3) (k, 1/3) Best Known Decision 23/32 − 1/k Decision XOS
Before continuing, we briefly remark the following:
• The 3/4-approximation guaranteed by the protocol in the first row is tight: randomized,
interactive protocols require exponential communication to beat a 3/4-approximation.
• The second and third protocols also work for general XOS (subject to updating the sketching
definition as in Appendix D).
• It is still open whether it is possible to beat 23/32 with a deterministic protocol for the
allocation problem, but 23/32 is optimal for any protocol using the Best Known Allocation
after Alice and Bob each report a (k, αi) sketch (see Lemma F.1 in Appendix F.1).
Additional applications of our sketches appear in Appendix F.2 and G, including a 2-round
protocol guaranteeing a 3/4-approximation for general XOS valuations, and our strictly truthful
mechanism. The strictly truthful mechanism essentially visits bidders one at a time, asks for a
(k, 1/2)-sketch on the remaining items, awards them the “Alice-Only Allocation” for their reported
sketch, and charges payments to ensure strict truthfulness.
5 Lower Bounds
Finally, we overview our lower bound for the BXOS decision problem (which implies Theorem 1.2).
We begin with some intuition: Alice and Bob will each get exponentially many clauses of size m/2.
These sets will be random, but not uniformly random.13 Instead, they are drawn in such a way
that the union of two random clauses of Alice and Bob has size (3/4− 1/108)m in expectation. At
this point, the optimal welfare is (3/4 − 1/108)m if we don’t further adjust their inputs. Finally,
we modify the construction either by hiding or not hiding a0 within Alice’s input and b0 within
Bob’s input such that a0 ∪ b0 = [m], in a matter so that these sets are indistinguishable from the
rest. Therefore, the answer to the decision problem rests on whether or not Alice and Bob each
have this hidden set, but they have no means by which to convey this information as this set looks
indistinguishable from the rest. This description captures all of the intuition for our construction,
which appears in Appendix H along with a proof of Theorem 5.1 below.
Theorem 5.1. For any constant ε > 0, there exists a distribution over binary XOS valuations such
that no simultaneous, randomized protocol with less than e2Cm/9 communication can guarantee an
α-approximation to the 2-party BXOS decision problem with probability larger than 12 + 2e
−Cm/9.
Here α = 3/4 − 1/108 + ε and C = 2ε2.
13If they were uniformly random, then Alice and Bob can guarantee 3m/4 in expectation by just reporting a single
arbitrary clause, because two uniformly random sets of size m/2 have union 3m/4 in expectation.
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6 Discussion and Future Work
Our main result shows a simultaneous protocol guaranteeing a 3/4-approximation for the BXOS
allocation problem, and a lower bound of 3/4 − 1/108 for for the BXOS decision problem. The
bigger picture behind these results, even without consideration of truthful combinatorial auctions,
is the following:
• It is surprising that the decision problem is strictly harder than the allocation/search problem.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of such a separation.
• It is surprising that a (> 1/2)-approximation for either the allocation or decision problem is
possible at all, given the strong lower bounds already known on sketching valuation functions,
but we are able to get a tight 3/4-approximation for the allocation problem.
• A 3/4-approximation for the decision problem now serves as a new example of what can be
achieved in polynomial interactive communication (in fact, two rounds by Theorem F.2), but
requires exponential simultaneous communication. While such problems are already known,
this has a very different flavor than previous constructions, and will likely be a useful tool for
this reason.
The most obvious question is to resolve whether or not there is a 3/4-approximation for the al-
location problem with general XOS functions. If there isn’t, this would provide the first separation
between truthful and non-truthful protocols with polynomial communication via Dobzinski’s reduc-
tion [Dob16b]. Additionally, whether or not our protocol can be de-randomized is an enticing open
question: if no matching deterministic protocol can be found (implying a lower bound of < 3/4 for
deterministic protocols for the allocation problem), this would provide the first separation between
truthful and non-truthful deterministic protocols (Dobzinski’s reduction preserves determinism).
If our protocol can in fact be de-randomized, this would be fascinating, as this protocol would
deterministically guarantee a 3/4-approximation without learning the welfare it achieves.14
Finally, while we have provided simultaneous protocols for the allocation problem with approx-
imation guarantees strictly better than 1/2 when bidders have XOS valuations, it still remains
open whether or not a truthful mechanism can obtain a (> 1/2)-approximation for two-player
combinatorial auctions with XOS bidders.
14It somehow seems tempting to conjecture both that our protocol can be de-randomized and that it can’t - a
random clause of Alice’s does well on average with no input from Bob, so to de-randomize we just need Bob to tell us
something that identifies a clause performing better than average. At the same time it seems extremely unlikely that
a deterministic protocol will somehow provide an approximation guarantee better than 3/4−1/108 for the allocation
problem without violating Theorem 5.1.
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A Background on Related Work
There is an enormous literature of related work on combinatorial auctions. The state-of-the-art
without concern for incentives is a 1/2-approximation for any number of subadditive bidders [Fei06],
and numerous improvements for special cases, such as submodular bidders [DS06, Fei06, FV06].
With concern for incentives, the state-of-the-art (for worst-case approximation ratios and dom-
inant strategy truthfulness) is an 1/O(
√
logm)-approximation for XOS bidders, again with im-
provements for further special cases [DRY11]. The problem has also been studied in Bayesian
settings, where a generic black-box reduction is known if the designer only desires Bayesian truth-
fulness15 [HL10, HKM11, BH11]. If the designer desires dominant strategy truthfulness but is
okay with an average-case welfare guarantee, then a 1/2-approximation is known for XOS bid-
ders [FGL15]. Combinatorial auctions have also been studied through the lens of Price of Anarchy,
but a deeper discussion of this is outside the scope of this paper [BR11, PLST12, ST12, ST13,
FFGL13, CP14, DFK15, DMSW15, LLN01, CKS08, BMW16, FFMR16].
On the topic of simultaneous versus interactive communication, [Yao79] proposed the 2-party si-
multaneous communication model when communication complexity was introduced. [PS82], [DGS84],
[NW93] showed that in the 2-party case, there is an exponential gap between k and (k − 1)-round
deterministic/randomized communication complexity of an explicit function. In the multiparty
number-on-forehead communication model [CFL83], [BGKL03] showed an exponential gap be-
tween simultaneous communication complexity and communication complexity for up to (log n)1−ε
players for any ε > 0. [DNO14] recently showed that in combinatorial auctions with unit demand
bidders/subadditive bidders, there is an exponential gap (exponential in the number of players) be-
tween simultaneous communication complexity and communication complexity. In comparison to
these works, our separation between simultaneous and interactive communication for the 2-player
BXOS decision problem is of a quite different flavor, and makes the available toolkit for future
results more diverse.
B Formal Preliminaries
Here, we provide more formal details surrounding our model of communication, approximation,
truthful mechanisms, etc.
In a combinatorial auction, there are n players and m items. In 2-party case, we call the first
player Alice and the second player Bob. Each player i has a valuation function vi : 2
[m] → R+. (We
require vi(∅) = 0.) The goal for the auctioneer is to find an allocation S1, ..., Sn (S1 ∩ · · · ∩Sn = ∅)
to maximize the social welfare
∑n
i=1 vi(Si).
1. When we use “protocol”, it means that players honestly follow the protocol and the challenge
is to make the protocol have good approximation ratio, polynomial communication cost and
possibly small number of rounds. In this paper, we use the standard communication com-
plexity model and we allow public randomness and private randomness. For details, we refer
the reader to [KN97]. We want to emphasize two relevant properties of the communication
protocols here:
(a) We care about the number of rounds of a protocol. In each round, all the messages need
15A mechanism is Bayesian truthful if it is in every bidder’s interest to tell the truth, assuming all other bidders
tell the truth and have values drawn from the correct Bayesian prior.
to be sent simultaneously. We use ”simultaneous protocols” to denote protocols with
only one round of communication.
(b) All the protocols discussed in this paper are in the “blackboard model.” In the black-
board model, each message is broadcasted. Or in other words, each message is written
on a blackboard for all players and the auctioneer to see. In some protocol, we don’t
really need broadcast, we will specify where is the message from and sent to in those
protocols.
2. When we use “mechanism,” it means that players might not tell the truth and we need
to incentivize the players to cooperate. A mechanism in this paper can be considered as a
protocol together with an allocation rule and a payment rule. Let the protocol be pi and the
transcript be Π. For i = 1, ..., n, let Si be the allocation rule and pi be the payment of player
i. Player i’s utility is defined as ui(Π) = vi(Si(Π))− pi(Π). Player i’s goal is to maximize her
expected utility E[ui(Π)]. The expectation is over the randomness of the mechanism.
We further define the truthful mechanism as the following. Let mi be the message sent by
player i. mi is a function of vi and the history of the protocol. Here we only make the definition
for the case when each player sends at most one message in the protocol and all the mechanisms
in this paper are in this case. We say that mi is a dominant strategy (in expectation) for player
i, if for all v1, ..., vn, player i’s other strategy m
′
i and other players’ strategy m−i,
E [vi(Si(Π(mi,m−i))− pi(Π(mi,m−i))] ≥ E
[
vi(Si(Π(m
′
i,m−i))− pi(Π(m′i,m−i))
]
.
We say that a mechanism is a truthful mechanism if there exist dominant strategies for all
players.
One of our goals in this paper is to find an allocation that achieves good approximation of the
maximum social welfare SW∗(v1, ..., vn) (defined as allocation problem in Section 1). We say a
protocol is α-approximation if for all v1, ..., vn,
E[
n∑
i=1
vi(Si(Π))] ≥ α · SW∗(v1, ..., vn).
We say a truthful mechanism is α-approximation if for all v1, ..., vn there exist dominant strategies
m1, ...,mn for player 1, ..., n guaranteeing:
E[
n∑
i=1
vi(Si(Π(m1, ...,mn))] ≥ α · SW∗(v1, ..., vn).
C Tools for proofs
C.1 Information Theory
Here we briefly review some facts and definitions from information theory that will be used in this
paper. For a more detailed introduction, we refer the reader to [CT06].
Throughout this paper, we use log to refer to the base 2 logarithm and use ln to refer to the
natural logarithm.
Definition C.1. The entropy of a random variable X, denoted by H(X), is defined as H(X) =∑
x Pr[X = x] log(1/Pr[X = x]).
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If X is drawn from Bernoulli distributions B(p), we use H(p) = −(p log p + (1− p)(log(1− p))
to denote H(X).
Definition C.2. The conditional entropy of random variable X conditioned on random variable
Y is defined as H(X|Y ) = Ey[H(X|Y = y)].
Fact 1. H(XY ) = H(X) +H(Y |X).
Definition C.3. The mutual information between two random variables X and Y is defined as
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X).
Definition C.4. The conditional mutual information between X and Y given Z is defined as
I(X;Y |Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y Z) = H(Y |Z)−H(Y |XZ).
Fact 2. Let X1,X2, Y, Z be random variables, we have I(X1X2;Y |Z) = I(X1;Y |Z)+I(X2;Y |X1Z).
Fact 3. Let X,Y,Z,W be random variables. If I(Y ;W |X,Z) = 0, then I(X;Y |Z) ≥ I(X;Y |ZW ).
Fact 4. Let X,Y,Z,W be random variables. If I(Y ;W |Z) = 0, then I(X;Y |Z) ≤ I(X;Y |ZW ).
C.2 Concentration Bound
Definition C.5 (Negative Correlation). Let X1, ...,Xn be n random variables supported on {0, 1}.
We say X1, ...,Xn are negatively correlated if for all S ⊆ [n],
Pr
[∧
i∈S
(Xi = 1)
]
≤
∏
i∈S
Pr[Xi = 1].
Lemma C.1 (Generalized Chernoff Bound[PS97]). Let X1, ...,Xn be n random variables supported
on {0, 1} and they are negatively correlated. Then for any a > 0,
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ a+ E[
n∑
i=1
Xi]
]
≤ e−2a2/n.
D Missing Definitions and Proofs of Section 4
Here we give an extension of Definition 4.1 to non-binary XOS valuations. It is easy to verify that
Definition 4.1 and Definition D.1 are equivalent for binary XOS valuations.
Definition D.1 (Sketches of XOS valuations). For a XOS valuation v, define its (k, α)-sketch
(b1, ..., bk) as
argmaxb1,...,bk∈{a1,...,at}
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(xi,u − α · x2i,u)du
)
.
Here a1, ..., at are the clauses of v and xi,u =
∑k
j=1 1bj ({i})≥u
k .
Now we prove some simple properties of these sketches.
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Lemma D.1. Let (b1, ..., bk) be the (k, α)-sketch of some binary XOS valuation v. Let α ≤ 1/2.
Let a be a clause of v and A ⊆ {i|a({i} = 1}. We have
m∑
i=1
(xi − 2α · x2i ) + 2α ·
∑
i∈A
xi ≥ |A| − 2α · v([m])
k
.
Here xi =
b1({i})+···+bk({i})
k .
Proof. Because xi ≤ 1 and α ≤ 1/2, we have
2α ·
∑
i∈{i|a({i}=1}\A
xi ≤ |{i|a({i} = 1}\A|.
So if we can prove the lemma for the case when A = {i|a({i} = 1}, it will directly imply the
lemma for the case when A ( {i|a({i} = 1}. From now on, we will assume A = {i|a({i} = 1}. By
Definition 4.1, (b1, ..., bk) are some clauses of v that maximize
∑m
i=1(xi − α · x2i ).
For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, if we replace bj with a, then
∑m
i=1(xi − α · x2i ) will not increase. So we have
m∑
i=1
(xi − α · x2i ) ≥
m∑
i=1
(
(xi − bj({i})/k + a({i})/k) − α · (xi − bj({i})/k + a({i}/k))2
)
.
This implies
m∑
i=1
(
bj({i}) − a({i})
k
+ 2α · k · xi(a({i}) − bj({i})) + α(bj({i}) − a({i}))
2
k2
)
≥ 0.
Summing over all j ∈ [k], we get
m∑
i=1
(xi − 2α · x2i ) + 2α ·
∑
i∈A
xi ≥ |A| −
m∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
α · (bj({i}) − a({i}))
2
k2
≥ |A| −
m∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
α · bj({i}) + a({i})
k2
= |A| − α · (|A| +
∑m
i=1 xi)
k
≥ |A| − 2α · v([m])
k
.
Lemma D.2. Let (b1, ..., bk) be the (k, α)-sketch of some XOS valuation v. Let α ≤ 1/2. Let a be
a clause of v. a′ is an additive valuation and for all i, a({i}) ≥ a′({i}). We have
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(xi,u − 2α · x2i,u)du+ 2α ·
∫ a′({i})
0
xi,udu
)
≥ a′([m])− 2α · v([m])
k
.
Here xi,u =
∑k
j=1 1bj ({i})≥u
k .
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Proof. Because xi,u ≤ 1 and α ≤ 1/2, similarly as Lemma D.1, it suffices to prove the case when
a′ = a. By Definition D.1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, if we replace bj with a,
∑m
i=1
(∫ +∞
0 (xi,u − α · x2i,u)du
)
will not decrease. Let yi,j,u = (1bj({i})≥u − 1a({i})≥u)/k. We get
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(xi,u − α · x2i,u)du
)
≥
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(
xi,u − yi,j,u − α · (xi,u − yi,j,u)2
)
du
)
This implies
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
(yi,j,u − 2α · xi,u · yi,j,u) du ≥ −α ·
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
y2i,j,udu
≥ −α ·
m∑
i=1
∫ max(a({i}),bj ({i}))
0
1
k2
· du
= −α ·
m∑
i=1
max(a({i}), bj({i}))
k2
≥ −2α · v([m])
k2
.
Notice that
∑k
j=1 yi,j,u = xi,u − 1a({i})≥u. Summing over all j ∈ [m], we get
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
(
xi,u − 2α · x2i,u
)
du ≥
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
(
1a({i})≥u − 2α · xi,u · 1a({i})≥u
)
du − 2α · v([m])
k
= a([m])− 2α · v([m])
k
−
m∑
i=1
2α ·
∫ a({i})
0
xi,udu.
E Protocols for BXOS parties
E.1 Simultaneous protocol for two BXOS parties (implies Theorem 1.1)
Protocol 3 Simultaneous protocol for 2-party combinatorial auctions with binary XOS valuations
1: Alice computes the (k, 1/2)-sketch (b1, ..., bk) of her valuation v1. Then she picks j uniformly
randomly from {1, ..., k} and sends bj to the auctioneer.
2: For each item i, the auctioneer allocates it to Alice if bj({i}) = 1; otherwise allocate it to Bob.
Theorem E.1. Protocol 3 gives a (3/4 − 1/k)-approximation in expectation to the 2-party BXOS
allocation problem.
Proof. Let S and T = [m]\S be the allocation that achieves the optimal social welfare between
v1 and v2 (if there are multiple such allocations, just pick an arbitrary one). Let a be some
clause of v1 such that v1(S) = a(S) and a
′ be some clause of v2 such that v2(T ) = a
′(T ). Let
A = {i|a({i}) = 1} ∩ S and A′ = {i|a′({i}) = 1} ∩ T . We have A ∩ A′ = ∅. The optimal social
welfare is
SW∗(v1, v2) = v1(S) + v2(T ) = a(S) + a′(T ) = |A|+ |A′|.
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Let xi =
b1({i})+···+bk({i})
k . By Lemma D.1, we have
m∑
i=1
(xi − x2i ) +
∑
i∈A
xi ≥ |A| − v1([m])
k
.
Therefore,
∑
i 6∈A′
xi ≥ −
∑
i∈A∪A′
xi +
m∑
i=1
x2i + |A| −
v1([m])
k
≥ −
∑
i∈A∪A′
xi +
∑
i∈A∪A′
x2i + |A| −
v1([m])
k
=
∑
i∈A∪A′
(
(xi − 1
2
)2 − 1
4
)
+ |A| − v1([m])
k
≥
∑
i∈A∪A′
(
−1
4
)
+ |A| − v1([m])
k
= −|A|+ |A
′|
4
+ |A| − v1([m])
k
.
Define Bj = {i|bj({i}) = 1} and Bj = [m]\Bj . By Claim 1, the expected social welfare Protocol
3 gets is
1
k
·
k∑
j=1
SW∗(bj , v2) ≥ 1
k
·
k∑
j=1
(
bj(Bj) + a
′(Bj)
) ≥ 1
k
·
k∑
j=1
(|Bj |+ |Bj ∩A′|)
=
1
k
·
k∑
j=1
(|Bj | − |A′ ∩Bj |+ |A′|) = |A′|+ 1
k
·
k∑
j=1
∑
i 6∈A′
bj({i}) = |A′|+
∑
i 6∈A′
xi
≥ |A′| − |A|+ |A
′|
4
+ |A| − v1([m])
k
=
3
4
· (|A|+ |A′|)− v1([m])
k
.
As v1([m]) ≤ SW∗(v1, v2) = |A|+ |A′|, Protocol 3 gives a (3/4−1/k) approximation in expectation
to the problem.
E.2 Sequential protocol for multiple BXOS parties
Protocol 4 Sequential protocol for multi-party combinatorial auctions with binary XOS valuations
1: for l = 1, ..., n − 1 do
2: The l-th player computes the (k, 1/2)-sketch (bl1, ..., b
l
k) of her valuation vl for items that are
left. Then she picks j uniformly randomly from {1, ..., k} and broadcasts blj .
3: For each item i left, the auctioneer allocates it to the l-th player if blj({i}) = 1.
4: end for
5: Allocate the left items to the n-th player.
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Theorem E.2. Protocol 4 gives a (1/2 − 1/k)-approximation in expectation to the n-party BXOS
allocation problem.
Proof. Let C(n) − 1/k be the approximation ratio of Protocol 4 on n players. We prove the
theorem by induction on n. By Theorem 3, C(2) ≥ 3/4. For any n ≥ 3, let S1, S2, ..., Sn be the
allocation that achieves the optimal social welfare. For l ∈ [n], let al be the clause of vl such that
al(Sl) = vl(Sl) and Al = {i : al({i}) = 1} ∩ Sl. Therefore SW∗(v1, ..., vn) = |A1|+ · · ·+ |An|.
Let xi =
b11({i})+···+b
1
k
({i})
k . By Lemma D.1, we have
m∑
i=1
(xi − x2i ) +
∑
i∈A1
xi ≥ |A1| − |A1|+
∑m
i=1 xi
2k
.
Notice this not exactly from the statement of Lemma D.1, but it is explicit from the proof of Lemma
D.1.
Let Bj = {i|b1j ({i}) = 1}. In Protocol 4, player 1 will get welfare 1k ·
∑k
j=1 |Bj | =
∑m
i=1 xi in
expectation. Let A′ = A2∪· · ·∪An. After player 1 takes all the items in Bj , the other players can at
least get welfare |A′\Bj | if we allocate items optimally. By induction, in Protocol 4, players 2 to n
will get welfare (C(n−1)−1/k) · |A′\Bj| conditioned on player 1 gets Bj. So in expectation, players
2 to n will get welfare at least 1k ·
∑k
j=1(C(n−1)−1/k)·|A′\Bj | = (C(n−1)−1/k)·(|A′ |−
∑
i∈A′ xi).
So in expectation, Protocol 4 gets welfare at least
m∑
i=1
xi + (C(n− 1)− 1/k) · (|A′| −
∑
i∈A′
xi)
≥
m∑
i=1
xi + (C(n− 1)− 1/k) · (|A′| −
∑
i∈A′
xi)
+C(n− 1)

|A1| − |A1|+
∑m
i=1 xi
2k
−
m∑
i=1
(xi − x2i )−
∑
i∈A1
xi


= C(n− 1) · (|A′|+ |A1|) +
∑
i∈A1∪A′
(
(1− 2C(n− 1)) xi + C(n− 1)x2i
)
+
∑
i 6∈A1∪A′
(
(1−C(n− 1))xi + C(n− 1)x2i
)− 1
k
(
|A′| −
∑
i∈A′
xi + C(n− 1) · |A1|+
∑m
i=1 xi
2
)
≥ C(n− 1) · (|A′|+ |A1|) +
m∑
i=1
C(n− 1)
((
xi − 2C(n− 1)− 1
2C(n− 1)
)2
− (2C(n− 1)− 1)
2
4C(n− 1)
)
+0− (|A1|+ |A
′|) + (∑i 6∈A′ xi + |A′|)
2k
≥
(
C(n− 1)− (2C(n − 1)− 1)
2
4C(n− 1) −
1
k
)
· SW∗(v1, ..., vn)
=
(
1− 1
4C(n − 1) −
1
k
)
· SW∗(v1, ..., vn).
So we have
C(n) ≥ 1− 1
4C(n− 1) =
1
2
+
C(n− 1)− 12
2C(n − 1) .
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This means C(n − 1) ≥ 1/2 would imply C(n) ≥ 1/2. As C(2) ≥ 3/4, we know that C(n) ≥ 1/2
for all n ≥ 2.
F Protocols for XOS parties
F.1 Simultaneous protocol for two XOS parties (implies part of Theorem 1.2)
Protocol 5 Deterministic, simultaneous protocol for 2-party combinatorial auctions with XOS
valuations
1: Alice sends the (k, 1/3)-sketch (b11, ..., b
1
k) of her valuation v1 and Bob sends the (k, 1/3)-sketch
(b21, ..., b
2
k) of his valuation v2 simultaneously to the auctioneer.
2: For allocation problem: Auctioneer finds j, j′ maximize SW∗(b1j , b2j′) and allocates items
using the allocation that achieves SW∗(b1j , b2j′).
3: For decision problem: Let X be the parameter in the decision problem. Auctioneer finds
j, j′ maximize SW∗(b1j , b2j′). If SW∗(b1j , b2j′) ≥ (23/32 − 1/k)X, say ”yes” (SW∗(v1, v2) ≥ X).
If SW∗(b1j , b2j′) < (23/32 − 1/k)X, say ”no”.
Theorem F.1. Protocol 5 gives a (23/32 − 1/k)-approximation to the 2-party XOS allocation
problem and the 2-party XOS decision problem.
Proof. Let allocation (S, T = [m]\S) achieves SW∗(v1, v2). Let a1 be the clause of v1 such that
a1(S) = v1(S) and a2 be the clause of v2 such that a2(T ) = v2(T ). Let a
′
1, a
′
2 be two additive
valuations such that a′1(R) = a1(S ∩R) and a′2(R) = a2(T ∩R) for all R ⊆ [m]. We have
SW∗(v1, v2) = v1(S) + v2(T ) = a1(S) + a2(T ) = a′1(S) + a′2(T ).
Let xi,u =
∑k
j=1 1b1
j
({i})≥u
k and yi,u =
∑k
j=1 1b2
j
({i})≥u
k . By Lemma D.2, we have
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(xi,u − 2
3
· x2i,u)du+
2
3
·
∫ a′1({i})
0
xi,udu
)
≥ a′1(S)−
2
3 · v1([m])
k
and
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(yi,u − 2
3
· y2i,u)du+
2
3
·
∫ a′2({i})
0
yi,udu
)
≥ a′2(T )−
2
3 · v2([m])
k
.
Therefore,
3
4
·
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(xi,u + yi,u)du
)
≥ 3
4
(
a′1(S) + a
′
2(T )
)
+
1
2
·
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(x2i,u + y
2
i,u)du
)
−1
2
·
∑
i∈S
(∫ a′1({i})
0
xi,udu
)
− 1
2
·
∑
i∈T
(∫ a′2({i})
0
yi,udu
)
− v1([m]) + v2([m])
2k
.
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Then we have
1
k2
·
k∑
j=1
k∑
j′=1
SW∗(b1j , b2j′)
=
1
k2
·
k∑
j=1
k∑
j′=1
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
(
1b1j ({i})
+ 1b2
j′
({i}) − 1b1j ({i}) · 1b2j′ ({i})
)
du
=
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
(xi,u + yi,u − xi,u · yi,u) du
=
3
4
·
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(xi,u + yi,u)du
)
+
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
(
1
4
· (xi,u + yi,u)− xi,u · yi,u
)
du
≥ 3
4
(
a′1(S) + a
′
2(T )
)
+
1
2
·
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(x2i,u + y
2
i,u)du
)
−1
2
·
∑
i∈S
(∫ a′1({i})
0
xi,udu
)
− 1
2
·
∑
i∈T
(∫ a′2({i})
0
yi,udu
)
− v1([m]) + v2([m])
2k
+
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
(
1
4
· (xi,u + yi,u)− xi,u · yi,u
)
du
=
3
4
(
a′1(S) + a
′
2(T )
)− v1([m]) + v2([m])
2k
+
∑
i∈S
(∫ a′1({i})
0
(
1
2
(
xi,u − yi,u − 1
4
)2
− 1
32
)
du+
∫ +∞
a′1({i}
(
1
2
(xi,u − yi,u)2 + 1
4
(xi,u + yi,u)
)
du
)
+
∑
i∈T
(∫ a′2({i})
0
(
1
2
(
yi,u − xi,u − 1
4
)2
− 1
32
)
du+
∫ +∞
a′2({i}
(
1
2
(xi,u − yi,u)2 + 1
4
(xi,u + yi,u)
)
du
)
≥ 3
4
(
a′1(S) + a
′
2(T )
)− v1([m]) + v2([m])
2k
− 1
32
(
a′1(S) + a
′
2(T )
)
≥ (23
32
− 1
k
) · SW∗(v1, v2).
So what Protocol 5 gets is at least
max
j,j′∈[k]
SW∗(b1j , b2j′) ≥
1
k2
·
k∑
j=1
k∑
j′=1
SW∗(b1j , b2j′) ≥ (
23
32
− 1
k
) · SW∗(v1, v2).
While we don’t know whether or not 23/32 is in general tight for simultaneous protocols for
XOS valuations, the analysis of Protocol 5 (and protocols like it) is indeed tight:
Lemma F.1. For any constant ε > 0, there exist binary XOS valuations v1 and v2 with sufficiently
large m such that simultaneous protocols in the following form won’t get SW∗(b1j , b2j′) larger than
(23/32 + 2ε)SW∗(v1, v2):
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1. Alice sends the (k1, α1)-sketch (b
1
1, ..., b
1
k1
) of her valuation v1 and Bob sends the (k2, α2)-
sketch (b21, ..., b
2
k2
) of his valuation v2 simultaneously to the auctioneer. (0 ≤ α1, α2 ≤ 1/2,
k1, k2 can be any positive integer)
2. Auctioneer finds j, j′ maximize SW∗(b1j , b2j′) and allocates items using the allocation that
achieves SW∗(b1j , b2j′).
Proof. Let’s assume ε < 1/8. We can do this because the result for smaller ε will imply the
result for larger ε. Let m be a multiple of 4 and we will specify how large m should be later
in the proof. Let parameter γ = 5/8 +
√
3/8. Let A1 = {1, ...,m/4}, A2 = {m/4 + 1, ...,m/2},
A3 = {m/2 + 1, ..., 3m/4} and A4 = {3m/4 + 1, ...,m}. Let t = 128/ε. We construct v1 and v2 by
the following procedure:
1. Let a10 be the binary additive valuation such that a
1
0({i}) = 1 if i ∈ A1 ∪A2 and a10({i}) = 0
if i ∈ A3 ∪ A4. Let a20 be the binary additive valuation such that a20({i}) = 0 if i ∈ A1 ∪ A2
and a20({i}) = 1 if i ∈ A3 ∪A4.
2. Let a11, ..., a
1
t , a
2
1, ..., a
2
t be 2t binary additive valuations. For l = 1, ..., t, j = 1, ..4 and i ∈ Aj ,
set a1l ({i}) to be 1 with probability pj independently. For l = 1, ..., t, j = 1, ..4 and i ∈ Aj ,
set a2l ({i}) to be 1 with probability qj independently. Here p1 = 5/4 − γ + ε, p2 = γ + ε,
p3 = 1− γ, p4 = γ − 1/4, q1 = 1− γ, q2 = γ − 1/4, q3 = 5/4− γ + ε, q4 = γ + ε.
3. Let v1 be the binary XOS valuation with t + 1 clauses a
1
0, ..., a
1
t . Let v2 be the binary XOS
valuation with t+ 1 clauses a20, ..., a
2
t .
We first show that with positive probability, the following conditions are all satisfied:
1. (1/2 + 7ε/16)m ≤ a1j([m]) ≤ (1/2 + ε)m, ∀j ∈ [t].
2. (1/2 + 7ε/16)m ≤ a2j([m]) ≤ (1/2 + ε)m, ∀j ∈ [t].
3. (5/16 + 7ε/16)m ≤ a1j (A1 ∪A2) ≤ m/2, ∀j ∈ [t].
4. (5/16 + 7ε/16)m ≤ a2j (A3 ∪A4) ≤ m/2, ∀j ∈ [t].
5.
∑m
i=1 a
1
j({i})a1l ({i}) ≤ (5/16 + 3ε/4)m ,∀j, l ∈ [t], j 6= l.
6.
∑m
i=1 a
2
j({i})a2l ({i}) ≤ (5/16 + 3ε/4)m ,∀j, l ∈ [t], j 6= l.
7.
∑m
i=1 a
1
j({i})a2l ({i}) ≥ 9m/32, ∀j, l ∈ [t].
The mean values of these terms are:
1. E[a1j ([m])] = E[a
2
j([m])] = (1/2 + ε/2)m, ∀j ∈ [t].
2. E[a1j (A1 ∪A2)] = E[a2j(A3 ∪A4)] = (5/16 + ε/2)m, ∀j 6= [t].
3. E[
∑m
i=1 a
1
j({i})a1l ({i})] = E[
∑m
i=1 a
2
j ({i})a2l ({i})] = (5/16+5ε/8+ε2/2)m ≤ (5/16+11ε/16)m,
∀j, l ∈ [t], j 6= l.
4. E[
∑m
i=1 a
1
j({i})a2l ({i})] = (9/32 + 3ε/8)m, ∀j, l ∈ [t].
By Chernoff bound, each of these conditions is satisfied with probability 1 − e−Ω(ε2m). There are
2t2 + 7t conditions. So by union bound, all of them are satisfied with probability ≥ 1 − (2t2 +
7t)e−Ω(ε
2m). By picking m large enough, this probability will be positive. So we can find v1 and v2
sampled from our procedure and satisfy all these conditions.
Now we assume v1 and v2 satisfy all these conditions. We have SW∗(v1, v2) = SW∗(a10, a20) = m.
On the other hand, ∀j, l ∈ [t],
SW∗(a1j , a2l ) =
m∑
i=1
(−a1j({i})a2l ({i}) + a1j({i}) + a2l ({i})) ≤ 2·(1/2+ε)m−9m/32 ≤ (23/32+2ε)m.
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So in order to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that both a10 and a
2
0 cannot not appear in
Alice and Bob’s sketches for arbitrary positive integers k1, k2 and 0 ≤ α1, α2 ≤ 1/2. Wlog, we
will only show a10 cannot not appear in the (k, α)-sketch of v1 for arbitrary positive integer k and
0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2.
Let (b1, ..., bk) to be a (k, α)-sketch of v1. Let f(b1, ..., bk) be the term that this sketch is trying
to maximize by choosing b1, ..., bk over a
1
0, ..., a
1
t . Recall that
f(b1, ..., bk) =
m∑
i=1

∑kj=1 bj({i})
k
− α
(∑k
j=1 bj({i})
k
)2
=
1
k
m∑
i=1

 k∑
j=1
(1− α/k)bj({i}) − α
∑
j′∈[k],j′ 6=j
bj({i})bj′({i})/k

 .
Suppose a10 appears in the sketch. Wlog assume b1 = a
1
0. Let b
′
1 = a
1
l such that |{j|2 ≤ j ≤ k, bj =
a1l }| ≤ k/t. We can always find such l by averaging argument. We have
f(b′1, b2, ..., bk)− f(b1, ..., bk)
=
1
k
m∑
i=1

(1− α/k)(b′1({i}) − b1({i})) + 2α ∑
2≤j≤k
bj({i})(b1({i}) − b′1({i}))/k


We know that
m∑
i=1
b′1({i}) − b1({i}) ≥ (1/2 + 7ε/16)m −m/2 = 7εm/16.
We have to do a case analysis for term
∑m
i=1 bj({i})(b1({i}) − b′1({i})):
1. If bj = a
1
0, then
m∑
i=1
bj({i})(b1({i}) − b′1({i})) ≥ m/2−m/2 = 0.
2. If bj = a
1
l , then
m∑
i=1
bj({i})(b1({i}) − b′1({i})) ≥ −
m∑
i=1
a1l ({i}) = −(1/2 + ε)m.
3. If bj 6= a1l , a10, then
m∑
i=1
bj({i})(b1({i}) − b′1({i})) ≥ (5/16 + 7ε/16)m − (5/16 + 3ε/4)m = −5εm/16.
If k = 1,
f(b′1)− f(b1) = (1− α)
m∑
i=1
b′1({i}) − b1({i}) > 0.
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Now we assume k > 1. We have
f(b′1, b2, ..., bk)− f(b1, ..., bk)
≥ m
k
((1− α/k)(7ε/16) − 2α(5ε/16) − 2α(1/2 + ε)/t)
≥ m
k
((3/4)(7ε/16) − (5ε/16) − (1/2 + ε)/t)
≥ εm
k
(1/64 − 1/εt) > 0.
Now we get a contradiction. So a10 cannot be in the sketch.
F.2 Two-round protocol for two XOS parties
Protocol 6 Two-round, deterministic protocol for 2-party combinatorial auctions with XOS valu-
ations
1: Alice computes the (k, 1/2)-sketch (b1, ..., bk) of her valuation v1 and sends it to Bob. Bob find
j that maximize SW (bj , v2), and sends SW (bj, v2) together with the allocation that achieves
SW (bj, v2) to the auctioneer.
2: For allocation problem: The auctioneer allocates items according to the allocation provided
by Bob.
3: For decision problem: Let X be the parameter in the decision problem. If SW (bj, v2) ≥
(3/4− 1/k)X, say ”yes” (SW∗(v1, v2) ≥ X). If SW (bj , v2) < (3/4 − 1/k)X, say ”no”.
Theorem F.2. Protocol 6 gives a (3/4−1/k)-approximation to the 2-party XOS allocation problem
and the 2-party XOS decision problem.
Proof. Let allocation (S, T = [m]\S) achieves SW∗(v1, v2). Let a1 be the clause of v1 such that
a1(S) = v1(S) and a2 be the clause of v2 such that a2(T ) = v2(T ). Let a
′
1, a
′
2 be two additive
valuations such that a′1(R) = a1(S ∩R) and a′2(R) = a2(T ∩R) for all R ⊆ [m]. We have
SW∗(v1, v2) = v1(S) + v2(T ) = a1(S) + a2(T ) = a′1(S) + a′2(T ).
Let xi,u =
∑k
j=1 1bj({i})≥u
k . By Lemma D.2, we have
m∑
i=1
(∫ +∞
0
(xi,u − x2i,u)du+
∫ a′1({i})
0
xi,udu
)
≥ a′1(S)−
v1([m])
k
.
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Then we have
1
k
k∑
j=1
SW∗(bj , v2)
≥ 1
k
k∑
j=1
SW∗(bj , a′2)
= a′2([m]) +
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
a′2({i})
xi,udu
= a′2([m]) +
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
xi,udu−
∑
i∈T
∫ a′2({i})
0
xi,udu
≥ a′2(T ) + a′1(S) +
m∑
i=1
∫ +∞
0
x2i,udu −
∑
i∈S
∫ a′1({i})
0
xi,udu−
∑
i∈T
∫ a′2({i})
0
xi,udu− v1([m])
k
= SW∗(v1, v2) +
∑
i∈S
∫ a′1({i})
0
(
(xi,u − 1
2
)2 − 1
4
)
du+
∑
i∈T
∫ a′2({i})
0
(
(xi,u − 1
2
)2 − 1
4
)
du− v1([m])
k
≥ SW∗(v1, v2)− 1
4
(a′2(T ) + a
′
1(S))− SW∗(v1, v2)/k
= (
3
4
− 1
k
)SW∗(v1, v2).
G Truthful mechanism for multiple binary XOS parties
In this section, we will show how to transform Protocol 3 and Protocol 4 into truthful mechanisms.
Since Protocol 3 is a special case of Protocol 4, we will only do the transformation for Protocol 4.
Mechanism 7 Truthful mechanism for multi-party combinatorial auctions with binary XOS val-
uations
1: for l = 1, ..., n − 1 do
2: The l-th player broadcasts k binary additive valuations (bl1, ..., b
l
k).
3: The auctioneer picks j uniformly randomly from {1, ..., k} and broadcasts j. For each item
i left, the auctioneer allocates it to the l-th player if blj({i}) = 1 and charges the l-th player
∑k
j′=1
bl
j′
({i})
2k .
4: end for
5: Allocate the left items to the n-th player.
Theorem G.1. In Mechanism 7, for any l ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} and any history before the l-player, if
(bl1, ..., b
l
k) maximizes her expected utility, then (b
l
1, ..., b
l
k) is a (k, 1/2)-sketch of vl for items left.
Note that this is not tight - a simple observation shows how to turn the (1−1/e)-approximation
of [Fei06, DS06] into a truthful mechanism for binary XOS bidders. One noteworthy difference is
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that in Mechanism 7, following the intended protocol is strictly more profitable than any deviation.
In the previous mechanisms, all bidders get zero utility no matter what they do. Mechanism 7 is
also considerably simpler than the previous mechanisms.
Proof. Wlog, it suffices to prove the theorem for the first player.
Let xi =
b11({i})+···+b
1
k
({i})
k and Bj = {i|b1j{i} = 1}. The expected utility of the first player is
k∑
j=1
v1(Bj)− k
2
·
m∑
i=1
x2i .
Assume (b11, ..., b
1
k) maximizes the first player’s expected utility. We are going to first show that
b11, ..., b
1
k are all clauses of v1. We prove by contradiction. Wlog suppose b
1
1 is not a clause of v1.
We want to show that (b11, ..., b
1
k) does not maximize the first player’s expected utility. Let at be a
clause of v1 such that v1(Bj) = at(Bj). Let At = {i|at({i}) = 1}. There are two cases:
1. Bj ⊆ At: If the first player reports (at, b12, ..., b1k) instead of (b11, ..., b1k), her expected utility
will be increased by
at(At)− at(Bj) + k
2
·
∑
i∈At\Bj
(
x2i − (xi + 1/k)2
)
=
k
2
·
∑
i∈At\Bj
(2/k − 2xi/k − 1/k2).
For each i ∈ At\Bj , xi ≤ 1− 1/k, so
∑
i∈At\Bj
(2/k − 2xi/k − 1/k2) > 0. So the first player
will get strictly more utility if she reports (at, b
1
2, ..., b
1
k) instead of (b
1
1, ..., b
1
k).
2. Bj is not a subset of At: Let A
′ = Bj ∩At. Let a′ be the binary additive valuation such that
a′({i}) = 1i∈A′ for i = 1, ...,m. We know that a′ 6= b11. If the first player reports (a′, b12..., b1k)
instead of (b11, ..., b
1
k), her expected utility will be increased by
at(A
′)− at(Bj) + k
2
·
∑
i∈Bj\A′
(
x2i − (xi − 1/k)2
)
.
We know that at(A
′) = at(Bj), so above term is strictly larger than 0. So the first player will
get strictly more utility if she reports (a′, b12, ..., b
1
k) instead of (b
1
1, ..., b
1
k).
Now we have shown that b11, ..., b
1
k are all clauses of v1. The expected utility of the first player can
be written as
k∑
j=1
b1j(Bj)−
k
2
·
m∑
i=1
x2i = k ·
m∑
i=1
(
xi − 1
2
· x2i
)
.
This is k times what we want to maximize in the (k, 1/2)-sketch. So when (b11, ..., b
1
k) maximizes
the first player’s expected utility, it’s also a (k, 1/2)-sketch of v1.
H Missing Proof of Section 5
We now provide a little more detail for the construction. Any claims in the first six bullets are
straight-forward without any background in information theory. Formalizing the final bullet is the
only tricky part, but will probably appear straight-forward to experts in information theory. The
real interest lies in the construction itself.
25
• First, draw S to be a uniformly random set of size m/2. Draw T uniformly random among
all sets of size m/2 with S∩T = m/3. Alice will know S (but not T , only that S∩T = m/3),
and Bob will know T (but not S).
• Each of Alice’s (exponentially many) clauses ai are drawn uniformly random among sets such
that |ai ∩ S| = m/3 and |ai ∩ S¯| = m/6. In other words, Alice’s sets are all of size m/2, and
all intersect S more than a uniformly random set.
• Each of Bob’s (exponentially many) clauses bi are drawn uniformly random among sets such
that |bi ∩ T | = m/3 and |bi ∩ T¯ | = m/6.
• At this point, with very high probability, the optimal welfare is (3/4− 1/108)m.
• Now, notice that there exist (many possible) a00 such that |a00 ∩ S| = m/3 = |a00 ∩ T |. There
also exist (many possible) a10 such that |a10 ∩ S| = m/3 = |a¯10 ∩ T |. So with probability 1/2,
add the clause a00 to both Alice and Bob’s input. With probability 1/2, add the clause a
1
0 to
Alice’s clauses and b10 = a¯
1
0 to Bob’s.
• We can prove that in case 0, we haven’t improved the welfare at all, while in case 1 the welfare
has improved to m. So in order to obtain better than a (3/4− 1/108) approximation for the
decision problem, Alice and Bob must figure out whether they are in case 0 or case 1.
• But doing so requires someone to communicate useful information about either a0 or b0, which
is impossible since all sets appear a priori indistinguishable and there are exponentially many
of them.
Theorem H.1 (Restatement of Theorem 5.1). For any constant ε > 0, there exists a distribution
over binary XOS valuations such that no simultaneous protocol with communication cost less than
e2Cm/9 can have an α-approximation to the 2-party BXOS decision problem with probability larger
than 12 + 2e
−Cm/9. Here α = 3/4− 1/108 + ε and C = 2ε2.
Proof. This proof uses mutual information (Definition C.3) and other information theory tools. We
also use generalized Chernoff bound for negatively correlated random variables. We mention these
tools in Appendix C.
To start the proof, we sample Alice and Bob’s valuations v1 and v2 from the below procedure.
It’s basically following the ideas above. Sampling in this specific way will make the later part of
the proof easier. Here M is the bit we want to hide in Alice and Bob’s inputs. Later we will show
M is equal to the output of the decision problem with high probability.
1. Sample S and T uniformly randomly from all the pairs of sets that satisfy S, T ⊆ [m],
|S| = |T | = m/2, |S ∩ T | = m/3.
2. Sample bit M uniformly randomly from {0, 1}. Let Sc = [m]\S and T c = [m]\T .
(a) If M = 1 then sample U1 uniformly randomly from all the sets that satisfy S ∩T c ⊆ U1,
|U1∩(S∩T )| = m/6, |U1∩(Sc∩T c)| = m/6 and |U1∩(T∩Sc)| = 0. And let U2 = [m]\U1.
(b) If M = 0 then sample U1 uniformly randomly from all the sets that satisfy S ∩ T ⊆ U1,
|U1 ∩ (Sc ∩ T c)| = m/6, |U1 ∩ (S ∩ T c)| = 0 and |U1 ∩ (T ∩ Sc)| = 0. And let U2 = U1.
3. Let l = e4Cm/9. Sample J1, J2 uniformly randomly from [l]. Set AJ1 = U1 and BJ2 = U2.
(a) Define DS to be the uniform distribution over all sets X such that X ⊆ [m], |X ∩ S| =
m/3 and |X ∩ Sc| = m/6. For j = 1, ..., l and j 6= J1 sample Aj from DS .
(b) Similarly define DT to be the uniform distribution over all sets X such that X ⊆ [m],
|X ∩ T | = m/3 and |X ∩ T c| = m/6. For j = 1, ..., l and j 6= J2 sample Bj from DT .
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4. Finally we set v1 and v2 as following:
(a) For j = 1, ..., l, define aj to be the binary additive valuation such that aj({i}) = 1i∈Aj
for all i ∈ [m]. And set v1 to be the binary XOS valuation with clauses a1, ..., al.
(b) For j = 1, ..., l, define bj to be the binary additive valuation such that bj({i}) = 1i∈Bj
for all i ∈ [m]. And set v2 to be the binary XOS valuation with clauses b1, ..., bl.
Since we are working on a specific distribution, wlog we can assume the simultaneous protocol is
deterministic. Let Π1 be the message sent by Alice and Π2 be the message sent by Bob in the
simultaneous protocol. The rest of the proof proceeds in two steps. We will first show that Π1 and
Π2 together convey very little information about M to the auctioneer using information theoretic
argument. After that, we will show that if the auctioneer has very little information about M , she
cannot solve BXOS decision problem with large probability.
For the first step, we prove the following lemma. It’s basically stating that I(Π1Π2;M) - the
mutual information (Definition C.3) between Π1Π2 (messages sent by Alice and Bob) and the bit
M is no more than the length of messages over the number of sets Alice/Bob has in its input.
Here’s an overview of the proof. The proof can be broken down into two parts. In the first part
we show I(Π1Π2;M) is upper bounded by I(Π1;U1|S)+ I(Π2;U2|T ). As defined above, U1 and U2
are special sets which contain information about M . The proof of the first part is roughly just to
use independence of random variables and the fact that M is a function of U1 and U2 to transit
through mutual information terms. In the second part of the proof, we show I(Π1;U1|S) ≤ |Π1|l .
The idea is that when only S is given, U1 looks similar to other sets in Alice’s input. We can prove
that the amount of information Π1 conveys about U1 is the same as the amount of information
Π1 conveys about some other set in Alice’s input. As Π1’s entropy is at most its length, we can
conclude I(Π1;U1|S) ≤ |Π1|l .
Lemma H.1.
I(Π1Π2;M) ≤ |Π1|+ |Π2|
l
= e−2Cm/9.
Proof. Since M is independent with S and T , we have
I(Π1Π2;M) ≤ I(Π1Π2ST ;M) = I(ST ;M) + I(Π1Π2;M |ST ) = 0 + I(Π1Π2;M |ST ).
Since M is a function of U1 and U2 (M = 1U1=U2), we have
I(Π1Π2;M |ST ) ≤ I(Π1Π2;U1U2|ST ) = I(Π1;U1U2|ST ) + I(Π2;U1U2|STΠ1).
Notice that
I(Π2;U1U2|STΠ1) = I(Π2;U1U2Π1|ST )− I(Π2; Π1|ST )
≤ I(Π2;U1U2Π1|ST )
= I(Π2;U1U2|ST ) + I(Π2; Π1|STU1U2)
≤ I(Π2;U1U2|ST ) + I(v2; v1|STU1U2)
= I(Π2;U1U2|ST ).
The second last step is because Π1 is a function of v1 and Π2 is a function of v2. The last step is
because after S, T, U1, U2 are sampled, v1 and v2 are sampled using independent randomness.
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It’s easy to check that when S, T are given, U2 is a function of U1. So we have
I(Π1;U1U2|ST ) = I(Π1;U1|ST )
= I(Π1;U1T |S)− I(Π1;T |SU1)
≤ I(Π1;U1T |S)
= I(Π1;U1|S) + I(Π1;T |SU1)
≤ I(Π1;U1|S) + I(v1;T |SU1)
= I(Π1;U1|S).
The second last step is because Π1 is a function of v1. The last step is because when fixing S and
U1, v1 is independent with T . Similarly we also get
I(Π2;U1U2|ST ) ≤ I(Π2;U2|T ).
So far, we get
I(Π1Π2;M) ≤ I(Π1Π2;M |ST ) ≤ I(Π1;U1U2|ST ) + I(Π2;U1U2|STΠ1)
≤ I(Π1;U1U2|ST ) + I(Π2;U1U2|ST ) ≤ I(Π1;U1|S) + I(Π2;U2|T ).
Finally, we just need to bound I(Π1;U1|S) and I(Π2;U2|T ). First it’s easy to check that when S is
fixed, AJ1 is also distributed as DS . Therefore given S, fixing J1 does not change v1’s distribution
. So I(v1;J1|S) = 0. As Π1 is a function of v1, we also have I(Π1;J1|S) = 0. Therefore,
I(Π1;U1|S) = I(Π1;AJ1 |S) ≤ I(Π1;AJ1J1|S) = I(Π1;J1|S) + I(Π1;AJ1 |SJ1) = I(Π1;AJ1 |SJ1).
We also have
I(Π1;A1A2...Al|S) ≤ H(Π1|S) ≤ |Π1|.
On the other hand, we know that for all j = 1, ..., l− 1, I(A1...Aj ;Aj+1|S) = 0. By Fact 4, we have
I(Π1;A1A2...Al|S) =
l∑
j=1
I(Π1;Aj |SA1...Aj−1) ≥
l∑
j=1
I(Π1;Aj |S).
Then we have
I(Π1;U1|S) ≤ I(Π1;AJ1 |SJ1) =
1
l
·
l∑
j=1
I(Π1;Aj |S) ≤ |Π1|
l
.
Similarly we have
I(Π2;U2|T ) ≤ |Π2|
l
.
To sum up, we get
I(Π1Π2;M) ≤ I(Π1;U1|S) + I(Π2;U2|T ) ≤ |Π1|+ |Π2|
l
.
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Now we are going to show that the auctioneer cannot solve the decision problem with large
probability based on Lemma H.1. Let D be the output from the auctioneer for the BXOS decision
problem. (D = 1 if the answer is ”yes”, D = 0 if the answer is no.) Since D is a function of Π1
and Π2, we have
I(D;M) ≤ I(Π1Π2;M) ≤ e−2Cm/9.
Let e = Pr[D 6=M ]. By Fano’s inequality ,
1− (e− 1/2)2 ≥ H(e) ≥ H(M |D) = H(M)− I(M ;D) ≥ 1− e−2Cm/9.
So e ≥ 1/2− e−Cm/9. This basically states that if mutual information between M and D is small,
then the probability of M 6= D is large.
Finally we will show that since Pr[D 6= M ] is large, the algorithm fails to solve the decision
problem with large probability. Let W be the indicator variable such that W = 1 if the one of the
following three events happens and W = 0 otherwise:
1. αm ≤ SW∗(v1, v2) < m.
2. SW∗(v1, v2) < αm and M = 1.
3. SW∗(v1, v2) ≥ m and M = 0.
We know that if W = 0, then M is the unique correct output of the decision problem. So the
probability that auctioneer fails to solve the decision problem is at least Pr[M 6= D]− Pr[W = 1].
Now we need to upper bound Pr[W = 1].
1. When M = 1, we know that SW∗(v1, v2) ≥ SW∗(aJ1 , bJ2) = |U1 ∪ U2| = m. So Pr[W =
1|M = 1] = 0.
2. When M = 0, we know that SW∗(v1, v2) = maxj1,j2∈[l] SW∗(aj1 , bj2). Therefore,
Pr[W = 1|M = 0] ≤ Pr[SW∗(v1, v2) > αm|M = 0] ≤
∑
j1,j2∈[l]
Pr[SW∗(aj1 , bj2) ≥ αm|M = 0].
Define Xi = 1i∈Aj1∪Bj2 . We are going to upper bound Pr[SW∗(aj1 , bj2) ≥ αm|M = 0] in four
different cases.
(a) When j1 = J1, j2 = J2: SW∗(aj1 , bj2) = |U1| = m/2. In this case Pr[SW∗(aj1 , bj2) ≥
αm|M = 0] = 0.
(b) When j1 = J1 and j2 6= J2: Fix S and T . We know Xi = 1 when i ∈ U1. E[Xi] = 2/3
when i ∈ T ∩ Sc. E[Xi] = 1/3 when i ∈ T c\U1. So
E[SW∗(aj1 , bj2)] = E[
m∑
i=1
Xi] = m/2 + (2/3) · (m/6) + (1/3) · (m/3) = 13m/18.
Although Xi’s are not independent, but it is easy to check that they are negatively
correlated. By generalized chernoff bound for negative correlated random variables, we
get
Pr[
m∑
i=1
Xi ≥ αm] ≤ exp(−2(α − 13/18)2m) ≤ e−Cm.
Thus in this case, we have Pr[SW∗(aj1 , bj2) ≥ αm|M = 0] ≤ e−Cm.
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(c) When j2 = J2 and j1 6= J1: This is similar to the previous case, we can get Pr[SW∗(aj1 , bj2) ≥
αm|M = 0] ≤ e−Cm.
(d) When j1 6= J1 and j2 6= J2: Fix S and T . We know E[Xi] = 8/9 when i ∈ S ∩ T .
E[Xi] = 7/9 when i ∈ (T ∩ Sc) ∪ (S ∩ T c). E[Xi] = 5/9 when i ∈ Sc ∩ T c. So
E[SW∗(aj1 , bj2)] = E[
m∑
i=1
Xi] = 20m/27.
Although Xi’s are not independent, but it is easy to check that they are negatively
correlated. By generalized chernoff bound for negative correlated random variables, we
get
Pr[
m∑
i=1
Xi ≥ αm] ≤ exp(−2(α − 20/27)2m) = e−Cm.
Thus in this case, we have Pr[SW∗(aj1 , bj2) ≥ αm|M = 0] ≤ e−Cm.
Therefore, we have
Pr[W = 1|M = 0] ≤ l2 · e−Cm = e−Cm/9.
To sum up, the auctioneer fails with probability at least
Pr[M 6= D]− Pr[W = 1] = 1/2 − 2e−Cm/9.
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